Poverty Alleviation and Interhousehold Transfers: Evidence from BRAC’s Graduation Program in Bangladesh
No AccessPoverty ReductionNov 2021
Weak households usually depend on transfers from their social networks for intake smoothing, nevertheless there is restricted proof on how antipoverty plans have an impact on informal transfers. This paper exploits the randomized rollout of BRAC’s extremely-weak graduation method in Bangladesh and panel details covering around 21,000 households around 7 several years to study the program’s effects on interhousehold transfers. The method crowds out informal transfers gained by the specific households, but this is pushed generally by outside the house-village transfers. Taken care of extremely-weak households develop into additional possible to each give and get transfers to/from wealthier households inside of their village and considerably less possible to get transfers from their companies. As a final result, the reciprocity of their inside of-village transfers boosts. The results indicate that, inside of rural communities, there is favourable assortative matching by socio-economic position. A reduction in poverty allows households to interact additional in reciprocal transfer arrangements and lowers the interlinkage of their labor with informal insurance.
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